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ABSTRACT
This paper presents some of the thought framework underlying the movement characterized 
as anthropologische Medizin and medizinische Anthropologie, developed by the Heidelberg 
School. Drawing particularly upon the work of Viktor von Weizsäcker and Paul Christian, 
an attempt is made to relate the basic concepts of solidarity and reciprocity to current 
American bioethical thinking. Attention is paid to the peculiar historical circumstances and 
consequences of Third Reich medicine and to the critical test of its major forms of theory and 
practice represented by the Nürenberg doctors’ trial of 1947. A major conclusion need for 
a more complete reconstruction of the theoretical underpinnings of the Heidelberg School 
writings and a more thorough study of its relevance to contemporary medical humanities and 
bioethics.
Keywords: Heidelberg School, bioethics, reciprocity, solidarity, medical ethics, German 
medicine
“’Medizinische Anthropologie’” and “’anthropologische Medizin’”
The German terms ‘medizinische Anthropologie’ and ‘anthropologische Medizin’ 
belong to a family of cognate concepts developed by the writers of the so-called 
Heidelberg School, particularly Viktor von Weizsäcker, to designate an intense 
interaction between medicine and the human sciences. To translate them as ‘medical 
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anthropology’ or ‘anthropological medicine’ is misleading, since the meaning of 
these expressions in English or American literature refers to the application of 
ethnographic and cultural anthropological methods to the study of medical concepts 
and practices or to the impact of medical conceptions upon societal uses.
During the final decades of the nineteenth century and the first ones of the 
twentienth a movement opposing the positivistic turn of medicine appears in some 
German medical writings. ‘Naturwissenschaftliche’ or natural scientific medicine was 
based on the assumption that medical practice should be grounded on a systematic 
application of basic sciences like physics, chemistry, and biology to clinical work. 
German research could look back at a record of successes spanning from the field of 
basic research in physiology to important discoveries in microbiology, imaging 
techniques, genetics, and pathology. At the same time, it also recorded facts and 
observations which made the expectation of definitively conquering disease and 
death by means of medical science unrealistic. No lesser figure than Rudolf Virchow, 
the founder of ‘Cellularpathologie’, impressed by the state of public health in Silesia 
around the middle of the nineteenth century, devoted himself to ‘the social issue’ 
and coined the phrase ‘die Medizin isf eine Sozialwissenschaft’ (medicine is a social 
science). The contributions of Breuer, Freud and others, suggesting the influence of 
unconscious motives and drives on psychic functioning and eventually on bodily 
processes had not yet find their way to established opinion and were denied by some 
or ridiculed by others. The growth of social problems beyond the reach of medical 
practice made it imperative to address the organizational aspects of health care. 
Profound social and scientific changes characterized the period before and after 
World War I. Yet medicine was practiced as a ‘natural science’, dominated by 
mechanicism and positivism. 
There were many manifestations of the reaction against a mechanistic and value-free 
view of medicine. Some took the form of theoretical elaborations of the principles 
which had informed Romantic Medicine in the 19th century, with its emphasis on 
‘ideas’ and analogical thinking. A reappraisal of the works of Heinroth, Novalis, 
Carus and other writers of the Romantic period produced a flood of publications 
dealing with approaches to disease and illness different from those dictated by 
medical science. Many authors spoke of a ‘crisis’ in medicine, similar to the one 
being experienced by the natural sciences themselves [1]. The need for a 
reconceptualization of goals and practices was frequently repeated. The relationships 
of medicine to the humanities and the incipient social sciences were stressed. 
The trend toward integration found a precursor in Goethe: ‘Religion, Kunst und 
Wissenschaft eins sind von Anfang und am Ende, wenngleich in der Mitte getrennt’ 
(religion, art and science are one at the beginning und at the end, separated in the 
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middle) [2]. Eventually, these ideas also found expression in an epistemological and 
methodological synthesis known as ‘theoretische Pathologie’ (theoretical pathology)
[3,4]. This expansion of the medical gaze gave rise to anthropologische Medizin and 
medizinische Anthropologie.
The Heidelberg School 
at the beginning of the 20th century, extinguished the romantic influence on 
medicine, philosophical and anthropological questions were constrained within the 
limits of natural science and limited to the positivistic reformulation of Kantianism. 
Against this background should the teachings of the Heidelberg School be 
considered, designation proposed by the Spanish medical historian Pedro Laín 
Entralgo in the 50’s summarizing the work and ideas of men such as Krehl, Siebeck, 
and von Weizsäcker. He considered them representatives of a definite trend in 
German medical thinking and its underlying philosophy [5]. 
Some developments leading to the establishment of the Heidelberg School had to 
do with the conception of the human person as the site where disease manifests 
itself and is presented as illness to the physician. Friedrich Kraus [6] had seen the 
unifying principle of the person in the biological constitution (‘das Vegetative’) and 
proposed a theory of context and relationships (Zusammenhangslehre). Others 
proposed different holistic concepts, including appropriate therapeutic means and 
objectives for practice. By the 50’s, a consistent body of theory related to the person 
in medicine could be discerned [7]. 
Ludolf von Krehl ( 1861-1937 ) can be considered one of the first writers of the 
tradition termed Heidelberg School by Laín Entralgo. Ordinarius for internal 
medicine, he devoted part of his writings to the problem of the human person and 
its integration. He developed a form of medical personalism based on the spiritual-
psychological unify and uniqueness of the human individual. One of his most 
highly quoted statements was, repeating Hippocrates, that “diseases do not exist, 
only diseased persons” [8], which can also be found in other authors [9]. Krehl was 
a prolific writer and his main work, which underwent more than a dozen editions 
and was published under the title Entstehung, Erkennung und Behandlung innerer 
Krankheiten in three volumes between 1930 and 1933, contains a valuable 
presentation of the core medical information of the period. Relevant here is his 
book Krankheitsfonn und Persönlichkeit (Disease form and personality), published in 
1929 by Thieme in Leipzig. The importance of Krehl for German medicine and his 
presence as author of relevant treatises and textbooks since he went to Heidelberg in 
1907 paved the way for a consideration of the humanistic and philosophical 
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dimension of medicine. Although a pioneer in considering psychogenic influences 
on medical disorders, Krehl would not have aligned himself with the 
“psychosomaticists” influenced by psychoanalytic thinking. The appropriation of 
this for medicine will occur in the work of Viktor von Weizsäcker. 
Richard Siebeck ( 1883-1965) introduced the biographical anamnesis in an 
expanded form. Medical history was in his view a life history. Each person does not 
only have a disease but in some way this is produced by the person’s actions. Medical 
history is not only a summary of medically relevant facts but reconstruction of a 
historical development, interpretable as a unit. Medical history is also a dialogue in 
which two persons exchange their views on the world and on life. One of the most 
influential works of Siebeck was Medizin in Bewegung. Klinische Erkenntnisse und 
t1rztliche Aufgabe, published by Thieme, Stuttgat, 1949. Of interest is also his paper 
on Die prämorbide Persönlichkeit included in the volume Individualpathologie, edited 
by C. Adams and F.Curtius, Fischer, Jena, 1939.
Viktor von Weizsäcker 
Viktor von Weizsäcker (1886-1957) brought to a culmination the idea that a truly 
integrative psychosomatic medicine does not consist in juxtaposing natural-
scientific and psychological theories and assertions [10]. It is not a matter of 
interaction between two substances, mind and body, but the comprehension of the 
fact that those aspects of the human being can be present to the observer in a 
complementary fashion. They re-present each other in a circular form, so that when 
a conflict arises the response can be a disease or a biographical turn, always endowed 
with a meaning which can be derived from the totality of human life. The principle 
underlying this cirularity of action and perception, of fate and disease, was called 
Gestaltkreis, and was grounded on physiological experiment and philosophical 
theory [11]. If physiological questions are asked about the totality of human life, 
then physiological answers appear; if, on the other hand, questions about the 
psychological aspects of life are posed, then psychological answers or answers 
expressed in psychological terms will show up. This methodological constraint was 
termed Drehtürprinzip. Both concepts show that complementariness is of the 
essence of a truly ‘psychosomatic’ theory of human disease and illness. In order to 
dissociate himself from a simplistic view of psycho-somatic theorization, von 
Weizsäcker started using the-expression medizinische Anthropologie as early as 1927, 
with the publication of three articles in the magazine ‘Die Kreatur’, which he edited 
with Joseph Wittig and Martin Buber. According to his view, the psychosomatic 
medicine of his day should transform itself and develop a theory of man based on 
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medical thinking, the construction stages of which should be anthropologische 
Medizin and medizinische Anthropologie. 
Throughout his career, von Weizsäcker consequently applied the notion of a formal, 
not a substantial, correspondence between those realities called mind and body. 
They constitute themselves in encounters between persons and one the most 
privileged is the one between the sick and the healthy, the needy and the helper, 
patient and doctor. His lectures and clinical demostrations would show the 
appearance of diseases at crucial points in life, when persons are confronted with 
biographical decisions and unsolvable conflicts. One of the basic questions he would 
ask was Warum gerade jetzf? Warum gerade so? (why precisely now? why precisely this 
way?). These were to constitute the crucial questions of psychosomatically and 
psychosocially oriented medicine, even in other traditions. For instance, Halliday 
condensed the diagnostic enterprise in three similar questions Why this person? 
Why this disease? Why at this time? [12].
The search for specificty was fundamental for psychosomatic theory, answered by 
different authors in different forms: conflict (Alexanderian), disposition or attitude 
(Grace and Grahamian), personality (Dunbarian), developmental arrest (Rueschian), 
inability to emotional expression (Nemiahian, Sifneosian), among others [13, 14]. 
Von Weizsäcker accorded a place to unconscious motives in his clinical studies and 
even presented his work Körpergeschehen und Neurose for revision to Sigmund Freud 
(whom he met personally only once, in 1926), who answered that, though 
interesting, the applications of psychoanalysis to organic diseases were not 
appropriate for psychoanalysts at that time. These should devote themselves to 
psychological suffering and resist the “temptation” of physiological theory.
In a biographical text of 1955, based on a talk delivered in 1947, von Weizsäker 
summarized his career indicating that it had been rather unsuccessful in the 
university environment [9]. He taught a complete course only one semester as 
deputy director of the Physiological Institute in Heidelberg in the winter of 1945. 
In 1941, during the war, he was appointed Ordinarius for neurology in Breslau and 
had to leave at the proximity of the Red Army in January 1945. He did not belong 
to any political party although in his writings he addresses political and social issues 
and took part in action as medical officer by the end of 1944. After 1946 he was 
appointed Ordinarius für Allgemeine Klinische Medizin, a position especially 
created for him with the aid of Richard Siebeck, then Director of the Heidelberg 
Clinic, in which he remained until September 1952. He died in 1957, after having 
produced a sizable written work and established a tradition which was continued by 
his assistant and succesor, Paul Christian (1910-1996).
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The Heidelberg School after von Weizsacker 
the legacy of Viktor von Weizsäcker found many expressions. Some developed 
aspects of his work outside institutionalized German university medicine. Parts of 
his work were expanded by disciples and students who would interpret them in 
radical ways. 
The official follower of von Weizsäcker the Chair for General Clinical Medicine was 
Paul Christian (1910-1996). Born in Heidelberg, Christian was student when Krehl 
taught at the university and received training in neurology, both in Vienna and 
Heidelberg. He collaborated with von Weizsäcker from 1935 onwards and 
accompanied him to Breslau in 1941. He received his venia legendi in 1940 and did 
research on color vision, sensory and motor physiology, and theoretical pathology. 
His areas of clinical expertise were cardiovascular dysregulation syndromes and 
general medicine. When the Institute for General Clinical Medicine was 
reestablished in 1958, Christian was appointed Director and remained in that 
position until his retirement in 1980. He also established in 1958 an Institute for 
Social and Occupational Medicine with H.Schäfer and H. Jusatz.
Christian contributed to the development of the Heidelberg tradition both in 
empirical and theoretical ways. He developed the concept of “bipersonality’ as the 
foundation of a medical sociology that could serve as an aid to practice [15] and 
studied extensively the neurovegetative syndromes. He became interested in stress 
medicine and was one of the summarizers of the main concepts of the Heidelberg 
School, beginning with his monograh Das Personverständnis im modernen 
medizinischen Denken, 1952, his work on the development of anthropological 
concepts, his theorization on Handlungstheorien (action theories) [16] and the 
impulse he gave to experimental analysis of dyadic and interpersonal behavior, 
particularly during psychotherapy.
After Christian’s retirement, his succesor and follower was Peter Hahn, whose main 
contribution to the Heidelberg School tradition lies in his work Ärztliche 
Propädeutik, where he combines the efforts of reaching the patient’s subjectivity 
with the idea that the doctor’s subjectivity should also be considered during the 
formative years of training and practice [17]. This notion resembles some put 
forward by other writers such as Fritz Hartmann (18) and can be considered an 
extension of the demands placed upon doctors entering psychoanalytic training. 
Efforts to restore the particular combination of experimental work and powerful 
theoretical analysis characteristic of the brightest periods of the Heidelberg tradition 
did not produce noticeable effects on contemporary German medical thinking.
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Some intellectuals who had accompanied the development of the Heidelberg School 
and taken part in some of its major accomplishments, undertook the task of 
preserving the legacy of von Weizsäcker, edited his collected works and founded a 
society which bears his name. Among the most important members of this society 
are Dieter Janz, former professor of neurology in Heidelberg, Cart Friedrich von 
Weizsäcker, renowned physicist and writer and nephew of Viktor, Mechthilde 
Kütemeyer, daughter of one of the disciples of Viktor von Weizsäcker, among many 
others. The objective of the society is to continue working towards the aims and in 
the spirit of Viktor von Weizsäcker, extending his intuitions and building extensive 
networks with people and ideas in different fields.
Some concepts developed by the Heidelberg School 
a characterization of the basic tenets of the Heidelberg School, from the medical 
personalism of Krehl to the action theorization of Christian and Hahn’s personalized 
medical propedeutics, through the diachronic biographic work of Siebeck and the 
seminal work of von Weizsäcker should include an appreciation of its profoundly 
conceptualized unity of the sciences of man. Medicine, as a science of the encounter 
between someone who needs help and someone who is willing to help, becomes a 
pivotal body of experience and ideas for the furtherance of a dialogic theory of 
human nature.
The fundamentals of medicine, von Weizsäcker wrote in 1944 in a document for 
medical students in the front, are knowledge of nature (Naturerkenntnis), knowledge 
of man (Menschenerkenntnis) and craftmanship (Kunstfertigkeit) [19]. The challenge 
was to widen and deepen the scope of medicine without losing what natural sciences 
had given it, that is, the possibility of turning subjective certitude into scientific 
truth. But this truth was a human one, based essentially on the reality and 
trascendence of the encounter between human beings. Solidarity and reciprocity were 
considered principles essential for the practice of human medicine. They were 
invoked to reject both the elimination of psychiatric and other patients and the 
human experiments performed by Nazi doctors [20]. Scientific medicine, powerful 
in action, considered human beings as objects and not as subjects, thus depriving 
them of the right to be responsible of their own health and destiny [21]. 
The main idea was repeated in different forms. Its best summary is probably the 
assertion that the task of von Weizsäcker, culminating the effort of the Heidelberg 
School, was the introduction (or re-introduction) of the subject into biology and 
medicine. This formula reflects the notion that beyond pure objectivity and without 
falling into the isolation of pure subjectivity there is a realm, sometimes called 
16
JAHR  Vol. 6/1  No. 11  2015
interjective, which conceives of human individuals as part of larger units: dyad, work 
in common, successful dialogue or psychotherapy, group, family, profession, 
institution, nation. It also considers the whole of human life, as in one’s own 
biography or the common history of groups and friends. Precisely where it might 
appear that the individual disappears the basis of the human person can be found. 
This is paradigmatically illustrated in Christian’s concept of bipersonality and its 
applications in rehabilitation and treatment.
The Heidelberg School vs. American bioethics 
no more discrepant scenarios could apparently be found than those of the 
Heidelberg School’s medizinische Anthropologie and the bioethics movement of the 
United States. The latter Originated in an affluent society which suddenly realized 
that considerable harms to people could be done in the name of medicine and 
science and that instead of being a monolithic social body it was composed by a 
mosaic of diverging interests: minorities, special groups, professional groups, all 
striving for hegemony and far from the idea of a unified community with shared 
visions of the good and the just. It was kindled by the need to bridge the gap 
between conflicting visions of reality, that of the natural sciences and that of the 
sciences of man. Van Rensselaer Potter [22] who is usually credited with having 
introduced the term bioethics proposed a discipline that could bring together the 
knowledge of natural science with moral wisdom and did not want to see it confined 
to the medical field. Previously, moral theologians had examined the way medical 
practice was being conducted and rejected some of the forms it took in American 
society. In addition, by the sheer pressure of technological development, de facto 
some participation of lay people had been accepted. The first committee to decide 
on medical treatments on no-medical grounds was apparently convened in Seattle, 
Washington, with occasion of the development of artificial hemodyalisis. As a new 
treatment modality offering hopes to previously condemned people, the demand 
was beyond the possibilities of treating all the cases and some decision had to be 
taken. The lay people committee met with doctors and health care professionals and 
established what probably was the first ethics committee in a medical institution. 
These developments, along with the realization that some practices within the field 
of medicine could not withstand a trial when considered from a humane point of 
view, led to the appointment of a Congress Commission and later of a President’s 
Commission to set up a set of standards for human research in medicine and the 
behavioral sciences. The protection of the subjects was to be achieved by establishing 
several principles as aid to moral decision-making [23). The Belmont report, 
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summarizing some of the main conclusions derived from the proceedings of that 
commission, ended up with a more or less systematic approach to a field that rapidly 
grew and established itself as a discipline. It received press coverage and dealt with 
cases which attracted public attention, such as those related to death and dying and 
to reproductive health. 
By contrast, medizinische Anthropologie remained confined to the medical sphere, its 
proposals were largely ignored and its humanly stance was contradicted by the very 
medical establishment which it set out to renew. Confronted with the physicians’ 
trial in Nürenberg, Viktor von Weizsäcker wrote a valuable document in which he 
contends that not only were they personally responsible for what had happened but 
the spirit of natural-scientific medicine was guilty as well for not providing them 
deterrents to cruel and inhuman behavior [16]. The trial in Nürenberg became a 
milestone for a tradition which antedated it and for one which followed it.
No attempt is made here at characterizing the many strands and special varieties of 
bioethics. Only major features of the movement and the discipline as presented in 
standard reference works are considered for the analysis [24]. Selected topics dealt 
with by the Heidelberg School may be fruitfully integrated to a current bioethical 
thinking.
Both traditions seem to have in common an interdisciplinary character, expressed 
rhetorically in the trespassing of boundaries. The psychological and the human 
sciences had their place along with medical facts in the writings of the Heidelberg 
School. The social and moral considerations are considered vis-a-vis purely technical 
facts in bioethics literature.
A second major similarity is the practical intention of both attempts, The theoretical 
character of some works of the Heidelberg School notwithstanding, effort was 
directed towards anchoring the ideas on practice and bringing objective facts closer 
to human experience. American bioethics had from the beginning a tool-like 
character in the formulation and solution of moral dilemmas arising in the practice 
of basic biological research and medicine.
In both attempts a clear conflation between principles and cases is readily seen. It 
was perhaps the inability of traditional ethics to deal with the particulars what 
rendered it insufficient for tackling the problems posed by new advances in the 
biological and medical sciences. The practical emphasis came from an application of 
Simple principles to cases attempting not to remain abstract and detached. German 
scientific medicine appeared neutral and value-free when facing the demands of 
political power precisely because its-practitioners considered ethics an abstract set of 
norms. Von Weizsäcker found guilty a medical science which considers human 
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beings as objects only and does not address their need for explanation, comfort and 
human closeness.
Both attempts bear witness to the Goethean sentence that art, science, morals and 
religion are fused at the beginning and at the end, with transitory divergences in 
institutionalization in the middle. In this regard, both the bioethics movement and 
medizinische Anthropologie embody ambivalence regarding a value-free scientific 
enterprise.
The idea of total neutrality of science and the maxim of doing everything that is 
doable, irrespective of its legitimacy, is present from the nineteenth century onwards 
and as a literary motif can be found in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein [25). In the 
novel, scientific production (in this case, an “artificial” human being), not being evil 
in itself, is corrupted by society and turns against its creator. Walton, who saves 
Frankenstein’s life, is advised not to pursue a scientific career for the dangers it 
entails to society and to himself. Both in Germany and the United States, the 
predominant image of the scientist in the popular press has been that of a person 
devoted to scientific work, irrespective of its consequences. This may help explain 
the ambivalence with which the whole scientific enterprise is viewed by the lay 
public and the stance adopted by critical discourse. The pervasive feeling is that 
human life and welfare cannot be left to specialists without some form of social 
control.
The perusal of selected texts of German medizinische Anthropologie shows that some 
concepts may be incorporated to bioethical thinking. Essential motives and 
motivations are similar into both traditions, albeit differently expressed and with a 
different impact on society. For those aspects of American bioethics dealing with 
medicine, an examination of Medizinische Anthropologie might be appropriate.
Medical ethics in the work of Viktor von Weizsäcker
medical ethics appears frequently in the writings of Viktor von Weizsäcker. In a 
statement about the origins of the moral dimension, von Weizsäcker alludes to 
psychology, and calls psychoanalysis a “moral science” (7/372) [26]. He seems to 
favour situationism and a certain degree of relativism when he asserts that a general 
medical ethics does not exist (7/93) because the very idea of medicine is not unitary. 
Hippocrates is no longer a guide (7/121), as many other all-embracing and general 
rules of conduct.” ... the moral norm manifests its real significance when it is 
expressed in the relation between two persons, without this it remains an unessential 
appearance”(5/87). We use to consider ethical norms “under the influence of 
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idealistic philosophy as something dissociable from the human persons”(5/71). The 
appropriate locus of moral certitude must be the encounter between patient and 
doctor. Both may be said to be constituted in it, sharing as partners tasks, burdens 
and responsibilities of life. Solidarity and reciprocity are to be construed as 
significant foundations of medicine.
When it comes to the foundation of those imperatives which could be called moral, 
by which people behave in civilized ways, von Weizsäcker refers in the first place to 
the Vitalbindungen, that is, those biological relationships which tie together the 
members of a family or a group. For the word to be a socially effective tool in the 
moral sense, attachments are a precondition. They do not possess in and by, 
themselves a moral character (5/84) but constitute the foundation for its 
development, provided they are adequately transformed during lifetime. To be 
effective moral norms have to be grounded on attraction but at the same time are 
related to hostility and repulsion. Other derived Vitalbindungen, like those 
represented by fear, shame or custom, may also help to establish obligations in a 
moral sense.
When von Weizsäcker traces back the origin of moral consciousness to the 
Vitalbindungen within the family first and then to the sentiments and feelings 
arising in social life, he is referring to sharing motives and expectations and the 
constitution of a community of moral friends [27]. The efficacy of the word as the 
locus of moral norm and action is not only dependent upon a common language 
but also common beliefs and the general acceptance that certain principles do exist 
and possess authority. Von Weizsäcker believes that Christian faith may be a 
powerful force shaping community ethos and thus providing the foundation for a 
consensually grounded medical science. Health is in some mysterious way related to 
truth and the real characterization of a person and does not reside in its being 
normal but in its being truthful (8/143). Science is, however, the only means to 
convert intuitive certainties into objective certitudes (8/143) but it is regretful that 
the foundational sciences of medicine lack moral and personal contents to command 
respect and prevent misuse or abuse of knowledge. Today, being more apart then 
ever.
Psychotherapy and psychoanalysis should be considered against this background. 
Von Weizsäcker saw them as means for guiding and accompanying persons in their 
search for truth and eternal life rather than as a therapy comparable to those 
employed by somatic medicine. However, for the word to be effective in 
psychotherapy either the Vitalbindungen have to be reconstructed (transference) or 
else feelings and sentiments (fear, shame. and habit) have to be employed. At about 
the same time, in 1929, Hans Prinzhorn wrote an interesting statement on the 
20
JAHR  Vol. 6/1  No. 11  2015
efficacy of psychotherapy: “Als unlösbares Problem aller Einwirkung von Mensch zu 
Mensch schwebt auch über dem Psychotherapeuten die Frage: im Namen welcher Instanz 
geschieht dies? Nur geschlossene kulturelle Gemeinschaften kirchlicher, staatlicher, 
parteipolitischer Art haben darauf eine feste Antwort. Die Entpersönlichung 
-Vorbedingung zur Lösung einer Übertragung- kann nur bei Berufung auf eine höhere 
Macht gelingen, in deren Namen der Therapeut handelt’’1 [28]. The strength of shared 
convictions is missing in the practice of medicine and that difficults the effectiveness 
of the healing and comforting word.
The profession of medicine is determined by science, humanity and belief 
(Wissenschaft, Humanität, Glaube) (5/11) All these are, however, external definitions 
and determinations. Virtues like charity are imposed to medicine from the outside. 
Medicine does not have its own theory of the sick person and by consequence lacks 
a proper way to prevent its abuse or misuse. What happens in medical practice 
cannot be legitimized by abstractions and is not reducible to mere intuition. 
Medicine starts with the need of someone and continues with a question. As it is 
usually practiced the “I “(I am sick) is turned into an “if (es) : is it the lung? the 
heart, the stomach? Medicine tries to cope with the demands of sick people by 
means of fragmentation. The number of specialties grows not only because the 
epistemic base expands and more complicated methods of exploration appear. 
Although this is true, positivistic medicine multiplies the specialties because it finds 
no response to the challenge represented by the simple assertion: I am sick.
Von Weizsäcker observes that comprehending what is meant by “I am sick” without 
training to do so means that concrete experience precedes theory-building in 
medicine. He warns against psychologizing the medical encounter, for psychology 
like surgery or pharmacology is just a means and not an end. Nevertheless, 
psychological understanding (in a wide sense) is at the center of the relationship 
between the doctor, the patient and the disease, the famous Hipochratic triad. What 
constitutes the doctor-patient dyad is neither pure objective knowledge nor simple 
subjective impression. For describing it, a neologism is used: comprehension and 
understanding of Someone is transjektive knowledge (5/20).
Viktor von Weizsäcker falls short of proposing a procedural foundation for a moral 
in medicine. He rejects the neutrality accorded to objective facts by a critical science 
which sees the morality of actions not in themselves but in the way knowledge is 
1 Exposure from person to person also hovers the question above the psychotherapists: in the name of what 
authority does this happen? Only closed cultural communities of church, state, political party have a firm answer. 
The depersonalization - precondition for solving a transmission components can only succeed when relying on a 
higher power, in whose name the therapist acts
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acquired. How would be more important than what, a position the author seems to 
reject (5/14). What is objective is not yet real (5/16).
Solidarity and reciprocity
viktor von Weizsäcker places a particular emphasis on the concepts of solidarity and 
reciprocity when giving a fundament to medical actions. It is obvious that he refers 
to an association between the doctor and the patient, although reciprocity is not 
equality and solidarity sometimes must be enforced. Both concepts are discussed 
within a theory of the person, comprising Umgang,
Gegenseitigkeit and Solidarität. Solidarity could be considered a modern form of 
sacrifice (7/102), which contains a powerful dialectical principle leading to the 
notion of solidarity in a secular context.
Reciprocity indicates a good Umgang and its origins can be traced to religions and 
to social situations where people come together. It is “die Logik des Umgangs” 
(7/364), a logic different from that of the objective sciences. Reciprocity should be 
considered “the” logical foundation of human medicine. The person needing help 
and the helper are on the same level, both are human beings in need of mutual 
support. If they agree, one of them may be accorded a restricted superiority in some 
aspects of the relationship.2
The idea of reciprocity should be related to the work of Christian on “bipersonality” 
(Bipersonalität). Christian starts off from the assumption that some realities do not 
find expression within the boundaries of individuals but in the relationship between 
persons, where they are constituted. Some diseases can be located in the three-
dimensional space within the body, others in the multidimensional social space; its 
paradigmatic form is the bipersonal dyad, but can be “strategically” expanded when 
more actors organize themselves to attain a goal. Reciprocity does not always entail 
equal effort or contribution from the participants in an encounter. Experiments in 
which a handicapped works with a normal person show that they adapt themselves 
to each other; the contribution of each to the whole is not discernible. The new 
reality created is not the addition of individual contributions. It is not a distributive 
with, quantitative result but a new product, that of a bipersonal action.
This finding derives from the fact that each human being is not first an individual 
and then member of a group. He or she is simultaneously member of a group and a 
2 Much later the anthropologist Byron Good will analyse this relationship with the critical weberian stance that 
doctors poses the soteriological power. The question is do they know how to use it in a moral way?
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conceived individual. One is always a father of a son, a student of a teacher, a 
brother or sister of-a sister or brother, a member of a certain group of people. The 
different identities do not exhaust the whole meaning of the person, which is in fact 
inexhaustible. But it can be asserted that each one is co-constituted by the others, 
co-determined by the relationships, be they biological, cultural, social or otherwise. 
This notion resembles Durkheim idea of homo duplex and has profound implications 
for the practice of helping professions. Fabrega [29] suggests an evolutionary basis 
for altruistic behaviors, particularly for those related to the care of the ill and the 
response to infirmitas, and disease that is the base of any appeal of helping others. 
Need, von Weizsäcker notes, is of the very essence of illness (5/13) and should build 
the foundation of any general theory of medicine. ReCiprocity is thus not a principle 
imposed from the outside but one developed from caring and curing within 
medicine. The institutionalization of this action-based description, its elevation to 
the rank of constituting an idea, is the starting point of a crucial disciplinary matrix 
for medicine. “In the beginning was the Taf”, wrote Goethe. In the constituting 
actions of the encounter and of Umgang the “truth” of the human condition 
appears, and truth is also health.
The Heidelberg School transformed the epistemic demand for rigor and objectivity 
of the object sciences into an ethical imperative: solidarity and reciprocity are the 
basis of healing and helping. The objective is not, and cannot be, the real, because 
those sciences which appear as the foundations of medicine constitute a discourse 
about medicine but not medicine Itself. The divorce between formal knowledge of 
biological and physicochemical particulars and its application -human and social 
affairs- is in no other disciplineIn no other discipline is the divorce between formal 
knowledge of biological and physico-chemical particulars, as well as its application 
to human and social affairs as profound as in positivistic medicine. In extreme cases 
it may be said that that form of knowledge is partly irrelevant to the pursuits of the 
physician.
In one of his articles von Weizsäcker recounts the story of the peasant who goes to 
the “doctor”(‘Krankengeschichte”, 5/48). The doctor is someone who knows. The 
peasant does not want to be cured when he first goes to see him. He wants to know. 
As we noted above, the scientifically trained/oriented doctor does not reflect upon 
the amazing fact that he can understand the other saying “I am sick”. Who is sick? 
Certainly not the tissues, the cells or the organs. Someone beyond cells, tissues, and 
organs, somebody who owns them and can say “I”. But the doctor is not a doctor, 
he is a physician. He converts that “I” into “i” he knows about”. He knows about 
cells. tissues, and organs and little about persons. He turns to the familiar realm of 
his objective knowledge and converts the I into many “its”: is it the lung, the heart, 
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the gut? What can we learn about metabolism? What about the lipids? All these 
questions are fine, but they do not answer the primary question of the peasant nor 
resolve his need. His need is first to know and then to eliminate those sensations he 
feels and the malaise which has made prey of him.3
Solidarity, reciprocity, bipersonality are means of constructing dyadic, triadic or 
multiple relationships appropriate to the actual circumstance and to the need 
without bypassing or ignoring it. The very first lesson professionals should leam is 
how to establish and mould the relationship appropriate to each situation. 
Everybody enters into relationships with others, everyone is made up of his o her 
relations. But only a well-trained helper or caregiver can have the tact, the prudentia, 
the phronesis to decide which type of dialogue, which kind of question, which mode 
of the relationship should be adopted. The superiority of his training and the value 
of his experience are tested in this praxis. He cannot resort to rules without letting 
the other decide whether or not they apply. Even less advisable is to moralize 
without charity or comprehension. People do not need compassion, they need 
professional help, and this is not always or solely provided through formal 
knowledge of biology and physiology. It is what really satisfies the need. To identify 
this need, to work through it, to respond to it are the real professional duties of a 
caregiver. The interests of the patient are best served if the medical encounter is 
shaped by solidarity and reciprocity and serves the transcendent goals of medicine.
Von Weizsäcker is aware that solidarity cannot be limited to the doctor-patient 
dyad; there is a social dimension to it. The larger society may demand sacrifices, as 
in war or adversity. The social context may impose some limitations on the practice 
of medicine. Recognizing these influences, von Weizsäcker comes close to 
recognizing at least two forms of solidarity: the horizontal, which binds individuals 
to each other, and the vertical, which ties them to a suprapersonal authority. This is 
evident in his essay on euthanasia and human experiments and in his other writings 
on social medicine. He might have accepted that the discretionary powers of the 
profession be reduced or be subjected to non-medical authority under certain 
conditions. He refers to this dilemma as an unsolvable one (7/131), making it 
necessary to elect the lesser of two evils.
Medicine is a science of actions; its quality does not reside in the objects with which 
it works or commodities it may produce, but in the way it brings about its 
constituting actions [30]. Reciprocity and solidarity are constituents of the 
bipersonal or multipersonal field in which good and bad medicines are practiced. 
Handlungswissenschaften or praxiologies do not produce goods or objects (poiesis), 
3 In the reality of interpretive medical anhtopology these dilemmas are analyzed bc, for instance good
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they realize human actions in their qualities [31]. These are the reality-defining 
properties of acts: praxis can be instrumental or teleological; when attempting to 
produce an outcome; strategic, when involving concerned persons; dramaturgical, if 
it aims at representation, normative if it follows norms, and communicative if it 
occurs in the symbolic milieu of language and refers to a reciprocal interaction of 
two equivalent moral agents [32]. Von Weizsäcker may have subscribed the notion 
that medicine is based on a communicative praxis.
A historical test: the Nürenberg trial
one decisive event in the history of medicinde in the xxth century was the 
Nürenberg trial the Nazi doctors. The resulting code established principles for 
conducting scientific research with human subjects. Extensively studied and 
reelaborated in different contexts, it has affected the medical and legal professions. 
Its moral authority has influenced research and practice, especially regarding 
voluntary and informed consent. Although it may be argued that the principle of 
autonomy existed in medical European tradition before Nürenberg, it was certainly 
this trial which made it explicit and essential.
The doctors’ trial and its outcome challenge the assumptions of medizinische 
Anthropologie and contemporary bioethics in several aspects. 
The moral compromise of the medical profession with power during the Third 
Reich can be seen as a failure on the part of the humane medicine of the Heidelberg 
School to influence Germany’s medical establishment. This was acknowledged by 
von Weizsäcker himself in his 1947 statement written as a reaction to the trial. 
In this paper, Weizsäcker confronts himself with “so called euthanasia”. He 
differentiates the Nazi practices from the accepted history of the term euthanasia as 
ars bene moriendi and divided into euthanasia exterior and euthanasia interior by 
Francis Bacon. He does not elaborate on the racial extermination but refers instead 
to the killing of incurable mental patients and to the experiments on human 
subjects, issues which he sees corelated. 
After establishing that “a medical point of view” does not exist as such, he goes on 
to ask which might be the bases for proposing extermination of human life and he 
discusses three reasons: life unworthy of being lived, compassion, and sacrifice. 
The notion of unworthy life was not a strange argument in pre-war Europe. Several 
countries enforced involuntary sterilization of incurable psychiatric patients. 
Binding and Hache, a lawyer and a psychiatrist, published a book in which they 
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pleaded for a humane elimination of those whose sufferings were unbereable or who 
were seen as leading an inhuman life [33]. A motif was the dignity of human life. 
Weizsäcker discusses the notion and observes that the whole of medicine is 
dedicated in fact to eliminating life that is unworthy, but not human persons as 
such. He adds that medical science, based exclusively on objective sciences cannot 
provide a control for not conceiving humans also as mere objects. He contends that 
unworthiness cannot be based soley on objective considerations but that human life 
should be viewed in relation to the trascendence it may achieve.
Compassion is not a medical argument for positivistic medicine and it is imposed 
from the outside. It does not serve to exculpate anyone.
Examining the notion of sacrifice, however, von Weizsäcker observes that this is a 
concept with such an appeal of dangerousness that it results in Nazi Germany may 
have derived from it. It combines the ideas of salvation and death and it is found 
frequently in the literature. Medicine sacrifices all the time: a limb that has to be 
amputated, a newborn with malformation who dies, a risk assumed because there is 
no choice, all these may be said to be sacrifices. The idea may find a place in an 
anthropological conception of medicine but not in the way the Nazis applied it. In 
order for sacrifice to be acceptable it has to be assumed personally and responsibly, 
that is to say, in solidarity and reciprocity. The locus of moral certitude is in the 
relationship between human beings.4
About the trial itself von Weizsäcker affirms that it is not only a trial of some people 
who may have gone beyond what is acceptable. It is also a trial of the whole 
foundation of medicine as a value-free scientific enteprise. It is, as Mitscherlich 
would put it, Medizin ohne Menschlichkeit, medicine without humanity. To legislate 
is correct, but isolated from the social context may lead to a legalism without equity 
or fairness and to a moralism without charity or concrete appeal. Natural-scientific 
medicine shows the clash between moral goodness (honestas) and advantage 
(utilitas), as presented by Cicero (De Officiis, book III, translated as On Duties).
With the principles of solidarity and reciprocity von Weizsäcker manifests that, 
essentially. What medicine is all about is not only scientific truth but ethical 
imperative. They become manifest in the encounter and in the relation and are 
essential for the establishment of a truly human medicine.
4 Although, if anthropology is analyzed in the historical context of the Third Reich, it was physical anthropology 
(athropometry) that was the founding ground of much of medical evil. To this day (American) biology anthropo-
logists remain uncosious of this fact.
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Concluding remarks: a research agenda
sharing the ambivalence towards value-free science and placing the locus of moral 
certitude in concrete encounters and relations rather than in abstract principles, 
both Medizinische Anthropologie and the bioethics movement are characterized by a 
rhetoric of transgresion that crosses over the established boundaries of disciplines 
and professions and by basing their contributions on concrete proposals for the 
practice of medicine. The differ in context, content, and methods.
The historical context is different. One is Germany before, during and after World 
War II, the other the United States in the sixties and seventies. The medical 
enterprise ended with a few principles and some rules for conducting encounters, 
grounded in physiology and philosophy. The bioethics movement became 
institutionalized as a tool for ethical decision-making. Based on principialism it 
cannot, through the principles themselves, support their relevance, nor can it 
establish a hierarchy of principles. It may be said that an ethics of maxima is based 
on the principles of beneficence and autonomy, of the minima on non-maleficence 
and justice. The latter entails prohibitions, the former admonitions. A new casuitry 
has been developed in ethics committees and ethical review boards which might be 
expanded with the principles of solidarity and reciprocity, and the realization of the 
Drehtürprinzip and the Gestaitkreis as practical depictions of real life. Medicine is 
and remains a science of actions rather than objects and has to develop its ethics 
from within, abandoning the notion that value-free objectivity is an asset for helping 
professions. Its disciplinary matrix should be contextual, situational, action-based 
and action-directed from its very inception.
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Fernando Lolas Stepke
Medicinska antropologija hajdelberške 
škole. Implikacije za bioetiku
SAŽETAK
Ovaj rad prikazuje dio misaonog okvira pokreta karakteriziranog kao antropološka medicina 
i medicinska antropologija koji je razvila hajdelberška škola. Temeljeći se uglavnom na radu 
Viktora von Weizsäckera i Paula Christiana pokušava se povezati osnovne pojmove solidarnosti 
i uzajamnosti s trenutnim američkim bioetičkim promišljanjem. Pozornost se posvećuje 
teškim povijesnim okolnostima medicine Trećeg Reicha i kritičkom ispitivanju njegovih 
značajnih oblika teorije i prakse prezentiranih na suđenju liječnicima u nirnberškom procesu 
1947. Glavni zaključak je potreba za potpunijom rekonstrukcijom teorijske podloge spisa 
hajdelberške škole i temeljitije proučavanje njezine relevantnosti u suvremenoj humanističkoj 
znanosti medicine i bioetike.
Ključne riječi: hajdelberška škola, bioetika, reciprocitet, solidarnost, medicinska etika, 
njemačka medicina
